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Your Guide to Washington and the World's 2024 US Election Means
The author is the director of the Carnegie Russian Eurasia Centre in Berlin.
When Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago, it was a fork similar to the 9/11 moment. Russia's attacks on its neighbors, though rooted in a fragmented journey into the country's darkness, were not inevitable. But when that happened, the war changed the course of history. The complete storm of challenges facing Western leaders is unprecedented in living memory, and managing relationships with Logu Russia is one of the most consequential.
The war, entering its fourth year, destroyed Ukraine, the main victim of unnecessary horror, unleashed by the Kremlin. Russia is a long time ago, but nonetheless, war is also a strategic disaster. Especially when measured against all peaceful alternative trajectories the country could take. The sad irony is that by invading Ukraine, Putin has created long-term security challenges for Russia, which had previously not existed. Three years ago, Western missiles were almost exempt from military targets within Russia, nuclear-free countries occupying Russian territorial masses, Finland and Sweden joining NATO, and Moscow's greatness was largely exempt from it. I could hardly imagine anything that wasn't there. It ruins a special special relationship with Germany. But all of that has come to pass. Furthermore, Putin is looking for ways to turn Ukrainians into fierce nations armed with teeth, and resolve the scores of the atrocities committed by those who called them “brothers.”
Russia is actually suffering from a “strategic defeat.” Then-Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the attack on Kiev collapsed in March 2022, causing the humiliating Russia to collapse. But fast forward to 2025, this picture is far worse than the victory expectation that many in the West preached to their masses and Ukrainians. Russia absorbs the set-up, soaring up the victims and pushing them against the abused Ukrainian forces despite destroying their equipment. Furthermore, the Kremlin embarked on a military restructuring. By 2030, its war machinery could be bigger and better.
Facing a tsunami of western sanctions, the Russian economy was expected to be tattered long ago. However, unlike the Soviet Union, it is carried out on market principles and managed by competent technocrats. The country is also a key exporter of oil and other goods, making it difficult to completely shut down the global market without disrupting it. This explains both the incrementalism of sanctions and the resilience of Russia, as well as support for self-interest from China and other non-Western countries. Finally, Russian society – even atomized even before the war – is co-cognised by oppression, and the elite, which are likewise atomized, gather around Putin.
Then, with the most surprising plot twist, Putin was lucky in Donald Trump's election in the US. The war has been on a negative trajectory for a while – at least since Ukraine lost its 2023 counterattack. But Trump's election makes the problem much worse. The Kremlin is looking for a quick deal, so it simply stops hostilities, but leaves Ukraine without reliable security guarantees and sets it on a path of collapse that includes presidential election bias I hope to become.
Whatever the unpredictable outcome of Trump's diplomatic cavalry accusations, one thing is clear. Even if Ukrainian guns remain silent, even if Trump lifts our sanctions on Russia, the current Kremlin administration will continue to view the West as a human enemy. Putin's victory, revenge, revenge, desire to be prominent in Russian history, the Kremlin's clear lack of checks and balance will begin preparing for the next war, strengthening its threatening campaign against Europe in Moscow I encourage them to do so.
Three years ago, the western capital believed that Kiev would fall in a few days. The combination of Ukrainian courage and ingenuity, and Russia's slow and western support evaded that scenario. Ukraine is still standing, Europe is painfully reducing its dependence on Russia's raw materials, and investments are being made in deterrence. However, other indicators make the situation worse for Europeans than early 2022. Advances in upgrading defense industrial bases remain patchy. The difficult post-Covid recovery has derailed the war in many countries, increasing defense spending and fierce selling for voters. Most importantly, instead of its traditional role as a foundation for European security, the United States under Trump is itself a source of risk. In addition, unity within the EU and within the vast country is becoming more fractured. Even if competent roadmaps such as the Draghi Report were created to address these issues, is there a political will to follow them?
One of the issues the West can and should address is hopeful thinking about shortcuts to defeat Putin and manage the Russian challenge. The unrealistic expectation of a perfect victory rooted in the obvious lack of a clear eye perspective has been part of the problem throughout the whole time. It's time for a quiet, calm conversation about how to mitigate the threat that will emerge from Russia over the next decade, and how to prepare what may come next.
